EU

On December 19, 2007, an amendment to the ITAR was published that revised the licensing procedures with regards to third party/dual nationals for technical assistance and manufacturing license agreements. It is no longer required that additional approval for a release of technical data, defense services, and access to defense articles for third part/dual national employees from NATO, EU, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and Switzerland. Read More

“Beware of apparently good news.” — John Black

In the December 19, 2007 Federal Register, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls (DDTC) of the State Department announced its new policy for dual and third country nationals. The change primarily is related to the requirement that when you apply for a Technical Assistance Agreement (TAA) or Manufacturing License Agreement, you must identify the foreign nationalities of the foreign signatories to the agreement. Read More

Well, these are a bit more solid than rumors:

First: the State Department has said that it relaxed its burdensome dual-national/third country national requirements for foreign nationals from NATO, Australia, Japan and New Zealand. If an employee of a company on a TAA or MLA is a national of one of these countries, they will be considered to be authorized to receive the US defense articles covered by the TAA and MLA and the applicant will no longer be required to obtain a non-disclosure agreement form such nationals. This policy change should reduce the current TAA and MLA burdens once (if) the State Department actually implements the policy.

Second: State plans to put out new brokering regulations soon. We will not know if this is good news or bad news until the regulations come out.

In mid-March 2007, the European Union adopted a proposal specifying trade restrictions on Iran. The goal is to further the restrictions placed on Iran, with emphasis on those practices which could contribute to Iran’s nuclear program. The proposal includes the following:

1. Guidelines for consistent implementation of the program
2. Specifying which goods and technology will be affected. Companies who wish to export such goods will have to apply for proper authorizations from the appropriate member state
3. Prohibition on providing technical or financial assistance to any parties listed in Annex I or Annex II of the Regulation
4. Authorization for Member States to override the above prohibition when certain criteria are met:
   1. Confirmation by the UN that transaction will not contribute to Irans’s nuclear program
   2. Appropriate end-use guarantees in contract
   3. Commitment by Iran not to use transaction for nuclear program
5. A freeze in funds or assets controlled by individuals or entities listed in Annex IV and Annex V

Penalties for violation of the regulations will be set out by individual Member States.

Source:

• Steptoe & Johnson Publications International Law Advisory:
  EU Draft Regulation Implementing Trade Restrictions on Iran March 14, 2007

Without formally requesting comments, BIS on April 14 published a rule substantially increasing export restrictions on several items subject to controls for chemical or biological weapons reasons (CB). This regulation comes only two weeks after a March 30 rule expanding the scope of CB catch-all controls to include members of the Australia Group (AG), the multilateral group which seeks to limit the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons. Steven Goldman, director of the Office of Nonproliferation and Treaty Compliance, first alerted the exporting community to the prospect of the new rule in a January 27 meeting of the Materials Technical Advisory Committee (MTAC). (This is as good a time as any to remind folks to be sure to read the meeting minutes of the TACs related to your business for all sorts of interesting nuggets, at least from those committees which deign to hold their discussions in open session and bother to publish minutes at all.)

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The United States and the European Union (EU) have imposed trade sanctions on Zimbabwe in response to President Robert Mugabe fixing Zimbabwe’s national elections and continuing crackdown against political
opposition. While both the US and the EU imposed sanctions of transfers of military equipment and technology, the EU imposed additional measures targeting President Mugabe.

In the April 17, 2002 Federal Register the Office of Defense Trade Controls suspended all licenses and approvals (i.e., agreements and retransfer authorizations) for Zimbabwe. At the same time, DTC also prohibited the use of any license exemptions in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations for Zimbabwe.

Soon after the corrupt election in Zimbabwe, the EU agreed to impose smart sanctions targeting arms transfers to Zimbabwe and Robert Mugabe.(“Smart sanctions” seems to be the new buzzword in Europe for sanctions
that have a precise target, in this case President Mugabe. The problem with smart sanctions is that the first few times you implement smart sanctions, you seem to be implying that previous sanctions were not “smart sanctions.” Does that mean earlier sanctions were “stupid sanctions,” or maybe just “slow sanctions”? Perhaps past efforts
have been “silly sanctions.” Rumor has it that the Bush Administration, not to be outdone by the EU, already has a plan in place to designate its next trade sanctions as “incredibly brilliant sanctions,” a designation
that just barely beat out “Texas sanctions” in an internal White House debate.

In addition to prohibiting transfers of military equipment and technology, the EU imposed to sanctions on Mugabe and 19 members of his inner circle: 1) The EU froze their assets, and 2) The EU imposed a travel ban on them. The EU also decided to prohibit the transfer of equipment that may be used for internal repression.